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DON’T MIND THE GAP: THE RISE OF
INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINT MECHANISMS
WITHIN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES
ALEXANDRA R. HARRINGTON
INTRODUCTION
An iconic message of the London subway system is its warning to
passengers to “mind the gap,” or, in other words, to be careful of the space
between the platform and the subway train.1 This simple warning is
applicable in many contexts. It has been particularly applicable to
individuals in the international human rights law context. Traditionally,
there has been a large gap between the human rights afforded to individuals
as a matter of international law and the state-based ability to enforce these
rights. However, the rise in the creation and use of individual complaint
mechanisms as a part of international human rights treaties has created a
significant challenge to the maintenance of this gap.
As this article will explain, the increase in the creation of these
procedures for specific groups through specific conventions indicates an
attempt to close the gap into which individuals with a human rights-based
grievance usually have fallen, despite the essential nature of the rights
guaranteed in such foundational documents as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. This rise also indicates that individuals per se are being
provided with a greater ability to close the gap by accessing the
international human rights law system that has for so long regarded them as
only peripheral actors to be given rights rather than as actors having the
agency to claim these rights at the international level. In sum, the result is a
steady penetration of the international system by individuals. Still, this
access is designed by traditional international actors and therefore has
 Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University; Doctor of Civil
Law Candidate, McGill University Faculty of Law. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the
2009 McGill Law Faculty Graduate Students’ Association Conference in Montreal, Canada. The author
wishes to thank her family for their comments on this article. She also wishes to thank Kate Hunter,
Jenna Feistritzer, and the staff of the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law for their
assistance with this article.
1. Signs informing passengers to “Mind the Gap” can be seen throughout the London subway
system and have spawned an artistic movement centered on their content.
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structural limitations. While some gap might indeed remain, increased
access has demonstrated that individual complaint mechanisms, and those
persons willing to utilize them to claim their international human rights, are
closing the gap.
Part I of this article provides a brief discussion of the international
human rights system generally and presents the concept of providing for an
individual complaint mechanism within an international human rights
treaty. Part II then discusses the individual complaint mechanisms that
exist—or will exist—within key international human rights law treaties,
specifically the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families (CMW), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD).
Part III of this article compares the status, rights, and abilities of
individuals under each of the human rights treaties. This Part argues that
there is a discernible trend in the increase of asserted rights and claimed
abilities of individuals through the expansion of individual complaint
mechanisms. With the necessary background and a comparison of
individual complaint mechanisms established, Part IV then examines
individual access to the international human rights system and discusses the
implications of this trend for the individuals themselves and the
international human rights law system as a whole.
Although the state-centric nature of the international legal system
necessarily results in a state-centric structure for individual complaint
systems, Part IV argues that the increasing prominence of the individual in
international human rights law is a discernible trend which stands to alter
the current understanding of the international system. This prominence is
based on a sense of individual empowerment which is greater than any one
articulation of individual rights in the traditional sources of international
human rights law. This Part goes on to argue that the increase in individual
prominence is certainly laudable but that, by attaching this increased
individual penetration of the international human rights law system to an
ever-increasing series of specialized conventions, there is a significant risk
of fragmenting the concept of the international human rights law system.
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This Part suggests that a better alternative would be for individuals, as
the foundation of international human rights law, to be able to access the
system based on their identity as the holder of human rights and human
dignity, rather than due to some specialized avenue of redress. This is
especially so because these concepts of essential human rights and human
dignity are at the core of the entire international human rights law system.
This recommendation stresses both the internal status of people as holders
of human rights and human dignity while also doing away with the need to
create new quasi-judicial structures that are themselves potentially limiting
depending on the ways in which they are drafted and function. Whether the
appropriate body to handle such a concept is the Human Rights Committee
or another body is not the overall concern of this article; rather, this article
highlights an important trend in international human rights law and
discusses the potential impacts of this trend on the international law
system. Underlying this discussion is the overall question of how the ability
of an individual to assert his human rights in an international legal context
impacts the international community, the idea of state-centricity, and the
understanding of international human rights law. At the individual level,
the underlying question is whether individual identity, which is reinforced
through access to the international human rights law system, is threatened
by the fragmentation often related to asserting individual human rights
violations.
Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the previous Parts and asserts that
the international human rights law system has created a system wherein the
individual has been empowered to the point of having a voice. The
individual can now use that voice in order to claim a place—however
limited—within the realm of international human rights law in a way that is
at once quite important structurally and yet can also fragment individual
identity when not understood holistically within the international human
rights law system.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
The modern international human rights system is generally regarded
as the product of World War II and the immediate post-war era,2 although
the antecedents of this system can be traced to the League of Nations.3 In
the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), the foundational document
for the United Nations, the concept of human rights, including the
2. Kitty Arambulo, Drafting an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Can an Ideal Become Reality?, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111, 11213 (1996).
3. See League of Nations Covenant art. 23.
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recognition of human dignity, is prevalent,4 and this recognition has filtered
through to the current organization and operation of the United Nations.5
Several years after the adoption of the UN Charter, the world
community endorsed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
a sweeping statement recognizing and valuing the essential human rights
and human dignities that are inherent in all persons.6 The rights recognized
in the UDHR include civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.7
Although it is, as a matter of law, a non-binding instrument, the UDHR is
regarded as an instrument of customary law and thus is binding on the
international community as a whole.8
In the years following the adoption of the UDHR, the international
community began to enshrine human rights in a series of treaties, most
seminally the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.9 A
variety of theories exist as to the political and legal motivations for splitting
human rights into these two categories for the purposes of legalization,10
and a full discussion of these theories is outside the scope of this article.
What is important to note is that these treaties were wide-ranging
individually and also when ratified collectively. The international human
rights treaties discussed below state that the principles and essential human
rights guarantees made under the two Covenants, as well as the UDHR and
the UN Charter, form the backbone of their content.11
Each of the international human rights treaties that contains an
individual complaint mechanism is overseen in its implementation by a
committee that is vested with the ability to decide on individual
complaints.12 A note should be made here that, as with all international
treaties and agreements, international human rights treaties are only
binding on those states that have consented to be bound by them.13 Further,
4. See generally U.N. Charter.
5. See, e.g., Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/rights/ (last visited July 23,
2011) (providing information on the involvement of the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies in
human rights development and protection).
6. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
7. See id.; see also Arambulo, supra note 2, at 112-13 (describing the rights guaranteed by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
8. Arambulo, supra note 2, at 113.
9. See Arambulo, supra note 2, at 113-14.
10. See Arambulo, supra note 2, at 114-22.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 11, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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when an individual complaint mechanism is contained within the text of a
treaty rather than adopted as an optional protocol, States Parties do not
become bound by the individual complaint mechanism provisions unless
they specifically express that they intend to be bound upon ratification or
afterward.14
As a general rule, the purpose of an individual complaint mechanism
within a human rights treaty is to allow an individual, or the individual’s
representative, or, in some circumstances, a group of individuals to
complain to the treaty committee regarding alleged violations of the human
rights contained within the terms of the treaty.15 The ability of an individual
to bring such a complaint hinges first and foremost on whether the state
alleged to have committed the violation is a State Party to the individual
complaint mechanism.16 Once this hurdle has been cleared, the individual
then must satisfy the standing and justiciability requirements contained in
the text of the instrument creating the individual complaint mechanism.17
The treaty committee may dismiss the complaint on grounds of
inadmissibility, or it may decide to hear the complaint in full, after which it
can still dismiss the case on inadmissibility or can decide the case on the
merits.18 There is no appeals process once the treaty committee has made a
decision on a complaint, rendering the decision of the treaty committee
final.19

14. The terms of each human rights treaty provide the exact methods by which a State Party may
agree to be bound under the individual complaint mechanism established in the overall treaty.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Parts II, III.
19. See generally Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
Optional Protocol to ICCPR]; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter
Optional Protocol to ICESCR]; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force
Jan. 16, 1969) [hereinafter CERD]; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83 (entered into force
Dec. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to CEDAW]; Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter CAT]; International Convention
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, adopted Dec.
18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2003) [hereinafter CMW]; Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to CRPD].
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In the event that a treaty committee decides in favor of the claimant, it
has far less enforcement power than a domestic court.20 The treaty
committee may publicly pronounce that there has been a violation21 and,
depending on the depth of the violation, has issued language condemning
the state practice that gave rise to it.22 The treaty committee may also
require that the errant State Party follow up within a stipulated period of
time and provide the treaty committee with information on the measures
taken to address the violation.23 A further tool is to declare that the
complainant is entitled to financial compensation for the wrongs done,24
although an exact amount of compensation is not typically stated and such
a finding is not enforceable in a domestic or international court.25 While the
individual complaint mechanism exists under the rubric of international
law, much of its direct impact on States Parties depends upon the attitude
of the States Parties themselves, as some have been far more amenable to
bringing the findings of treaty committees into the realm of domestic legal
influence.26

20. See generally Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19; Optional Protocol to ICESCR,
supra note 19; CERD, supra note 19; Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19; CAT, supra note
19; CMW, supra note 19; Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19; see also Human Rights
Committee, General Comment No. 33: The Obligations of State Parties Under the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (Nov. 5, 2008), at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm
[hereinafter Human Rights Committee,
General Comment No. 33].
21. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 33, supra note 20, para. 12; Wade M.
Cole, When All Else Fails: International Adjudication of Human Rights Abuse Claims, 1976-1999, 84
SOCIAL FORCES 1909, 1911-12 (2006) (discussing the prevalence of public shaming through the finding
of a violation as a meaningful method of ensuring State Party compliance with a finding of the Human
Rights Committee).
22. See Judge v. Canada, Views, Human Rights Comm. 78th Sess., July 14-Aug. 8, 2003, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (Oct. 20, 2003) (regarding the deportation of an individual to a state in
which he would face the death penalty); Johnson v. Jamaica, Views, Human Rights Comm. 56th Sess.,
Mar. 18-Apr. 4, 1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/588/1994 (Aug. 5, 1996) (noting the Committee’s
disapproval of the imposition of the death penalty where the ICCPR’s provisions are not respected
during the trial).
23. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 33, supra note 20, para. 14.
24. See, e.g., Wilson v. Philippines, Views, Human Rights Comm. 79th Sess., Oct. 20-Nov. 7,
2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/D/868/1999 (Nov. 11, 2003).
25. See, e.g., id.
26. See Shotaro Hamamoto, An Undemocratic Guardian of Democracy – International Human
Rights Complaint Procedures, 38 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 199, 200 (2007).
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II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES CONTAINING
INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINT MECHANISMS
A. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was
adopted in 1966 and became effective in 1976.27 Although the provisions of
the ICCPR are themselves comprehensive and manifest the collective
understanding by the international community regarding the civil and
political rights enjoyed by individuals,28 particularly as linked to the
statements in the UDHR,29 the individual complaint mechanism established
for the ICCPR is not contained in its main body.30 Rather, the individual
complaint mechanism is located in the First Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR Protocol).31
The ICCPR Protocol was also adopted in 1966 and became effective
in 1976.32 As of the writing of this article, there are 167 States Parties to the
ICCPR33 and 114 States Parties to the ICCPR Protocol,34 establishing both
the ICCPR and the ICCPR Protocol as two of the most universally ratified
conventions within the modern international law system. Under the terms
of the ICCPR Protocol, jurisdiction to hear complaints from individuals
who assert that they have been victims of violations of human rights
guaranteed under the ICCPR is vested in the Human Rights Committee.35
In order to assert such a complaint against a State Party, an individual must
be subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party,36 the meaning of which has
caused no small level of controversy throughout the life of the ICCPR
Protocol.37
27. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
28. See generally id.
29. See id. at pmbl.
30. See generally id.
31. See Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, arts. 1 to 5.
32. See Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19; see also Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&lang=en&mtdsg_no=IV-5&src=TREATY
(last visited Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to ICCPR Summary].
33. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=
4&lang=en (last visited July 23, 2011).
34. Optional Protocol to ICCPR Summary, supra note 32.
35. Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, at pmbl., art. 1.
36. Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 1.
37. For a discussion of these issues, see Orna Ben-Naftali, The Extraterritorial Application of
Human Rights to Occupied Territories, 100 PROC. OF THE ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC. OF INT’L L.) 90
(2006).
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Once a complaint is filed with the Human Rights Committee, the
Committee reviews it for admissibility. In order to have standing to bring a
complaint under the ICCPR, an individual must have exhausted all
domestic remedies that are available to them in the context of the matter
giving rise to the complaint.38 Furthermore, the complaint cannot be
submitted by an individual anonymously,39 cannot fall into either category
of “an abuse of the right of submission” or “incompatible with the
provisions of the [ICCPR]” as determined by the Human Rights
Committee,40 and cannot be pending before another international body or
be the subject of a settlement as determined by an international body.41
There is an exception to the domestic remedy exhaustion requirement:
where the Human Rights Committee decides that there is an unreasonable
delay in allowing the complainant to proceed with the requisite domestic
remedies, the Committee may waive that prong of standing.42
In recent years, there has been another admissibility hurdle where the
individual bringing the claim is not the individual whom the State Party is
alleged to have harmed.43 In this regard, the Human Rights Committee has
been largely willing to grant standing to immediate family members of the
alleged victim—particularly in cases of disappearance,44 alleged unlawful
detention and torture,45 and extrajudicial killings46—but has been far more

38. Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 2.; see also Mireille G.E. Bijnsdorp, The
Strength of the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Women’s Convention, 18 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS.
329, 331 (2000) (discussing the tie between resources available to potential claimants and their actual
tendency to both follow the requisite domestic procedures and file international claims).
39. Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 3.
40. Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 3.
41. Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 5.
42. Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 5.
43. See infra notes 44-48.
44. See, e.g., Grioua, née Atamna v. Algeria, Views, Human Rights Comm. 90th Sess., July 9-27,
2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1327/2004 (July 10, 2007); Kimouche, née Cheraitia v. Algeria, Views,
Human Rights Comm. 90th Sess., July 9-27, 2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1328/2004 (July 10,
2007); Bousroual v. Algeria, Views, Human Rights Comm. 86th Sess., Mar. 13-31, 2006, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/86/992/2001 (Mar. 15, 2006); Bautista v. Colombia, Views, Human Rights Comm. 55th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993 (Oct. 27, 1995); Izquiero v. Uruguay, Views, Human Rights Comm.
15th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/15/D/73/1981 (Apr. 1, 1982).
45. See, e.g., Bondonga v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Views, Human Rights Comm.
96th Sess., July 13-31, 2009, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1483/2006 (July 30, 2009); Khuseynova &
Butaeva v. Tajikistan, Views, Human Rights Comm. 94th Sess., Oct. 13-31, 2008, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/94/D/1263-1264/2004 (Oct. 20, 2008); Izquiero v. Uruguay, supra note 44; Khudayberganova
v. Uzbekistan, Views, Human Rights Comm. 90th Sess., July 9-27, 2007, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/90/D/1140/2002 (Aug. 7, 2007); Aber v. Algeria, Views, Human Rights Comm. 90th Sess.,
July 9-27, 2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1439/2005 (Aug. 16, 2007).
46. See, e.g., Bazarov v. Uzbekistan, Views, Human Rights Comm. 87th Sess., July 10-28, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/959/2000 (Aug. 8, 2006); Bautista v. Colombia, supra note 44; Camargo v.
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reticent to grant standing to those claiming to speak for a particular
community or even where a physician or lawyer has lodged a claim on
behalf of a patient47 or client.48 In these cases, the Human Rights
Committee typically has been unable to substantiate that those other than
immediate family members have the appropriate agency to speak for the
alleged victim.49 What this practice highlights is that the ICCPR Protocol
and the Human Rights Committee are focused on the individual and those
directly affected by violations, rather than outside persons or groups.
If a complaint survives the initial admissibility decision, it then goes
before the Human Rights Committee for a decision on the merits. These
decisions focus on the strength of the allegations made and, in light of the
additional evidence that is provided at that point, frequently return to the
issue of admissibility.50 In particularly dire situations, the Human Rights
Committee has interpreted its mandate under the ICCPR Protocol to
include the ability to request that the accused State Party take interim
measures to guarantee the protection of the claimant.51 These requests have
been prevalent in complaints involving the imposition of the death
penalty.52
The ICCPR Protocol permits a state to renounce its status as a party to
the Protocol provided that it follows a specific procedure.53 The
renunciation is not legally effective until three months after notification and
Colombia, Views, Human Rights Comm. 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979 (Mar. 31,
1982).
47. See, e.g., L.A. & U.R. v. Uruguay, Views, Human Rights Comm. 18th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/18/D/128/1982 (Apr. 6, 1983).
48. See, e.g., Palma v. Panama, Decisions, Human Rights Comm. 51st Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/51/D/436/1990 (July 26, 1994); Thompson v. Panama, Decisions, Human Rights Comm. 52nd
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/438/1990 (Oct. 21, 1994); Simons v. Panama, Decisions, Human
Rights Comm. 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/460/1991 (Oct. 25, 1994); Leach v. Jamaica,
Views, Human Rights Comm. 57th Sess., July 8-26, 1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/546/1993 (Aug. 1,
1996); Y. v. Australia, Decisions, Human Rights Comm. 69th Sess., July 10-28, 2000, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/69/D/772/1997 (Aug. 8, 2000); Padilla v. Philippines, Views, Human Rights Comm. 70th
Sess., Oct. 16-Nov. 3, 2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/869/1999 (Oct. 19, 2000).
49. See L.A. v. Uruguay, supra note 47; Palma v. Panama, supra note 48; Thompson v. Panama,
supra note 48; Leach v. Jamaica, supra note 48; Y. v. Australia, supra note 48; Padilla v. Philippines,
supra note 48.
50. See, e.g., K.L. v. Denmark, Views, Human Rights Comm. 10th Sess., July 14-Aug. 1, 1980,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/10/D/72/1980 (July 31, 1980).
51. Bijnsdorp, supra note 38.
52. For a discussion of this trend in regards to complaints brought against Jamaica,Trinidad and
Tobago in particular, and the resulting actions taken by these states to avoid agreement with the Human
Rights Committee’s decisions, see Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International
Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002).
53. Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 12.
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does not void the applicability of the Human Rights Committee’s
jurisdiction over cases already pending against the State Party.54
B. International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights
The International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) was adopted in 1966 and became effective in 1976.55 At the time
of writing, there are 160 States Parties to the ICESCR.56 While there are
many points at which the ICESCR mirrors the ICCPR, it is widely held that
the terms of the ICCPR are quantifiable and thus subject to quasi-judicial
oversight,57 while the rights guaranteed under the ICESCR are more fluid
and essentially aspirational, making them inappropriate for quasi-judicial
oversight.58 At the time they were adopted, there were also concerns that
the rights contained in the ICESCR were new, or at least largely
uncodified, at the national level, whereas the rights guaranteed under the
ICCPR were typically found in the national laws of UN member states.59
As a result, unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR did not contain direct
provisions or a protocol creating an individual complaint mechanism.60
Throughout the history of the ICESCR, and particularly over the past
few decades, a mounting chorus of civil society actors, the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR Committee), and some
governments began to pressure the international community to create an
individual complaint mechanism within the ICESCR context.61 In
particular, the ICESCR Committee asserted that an individual complaint
mechanism was necessary in order to develop an understanding of the
terms contained in the ICESCR, to establish how these terms should be
implemented, and to create an effective method for and forum in which

54. Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 12.
55. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter
=4&lang=en (last visited July 23, 2011).
56. Id.
57. See Tara J. Melish, Introductory Note to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 48 INT’L L. MATERIALS 256, 256-57 (2009); Michael J.
Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be
an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and
Health?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 464-67 (2004); Wouter Vandenhole, Completing the UN Complaint
Mechanisms for Human Rights Violations Step by Step: Towards a Complaints Procedure
Complementing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 21 NETH. Q.
HUM. RTS. 423, 431 (2003).
58. See Melish, supra note 57, at 256-57; Dennis & Stewart, supra note 57, at 464-67.
59. Arambulo, supra note 2, at 116.
60. See Melish, supra note 57, at 256-57; Arambulo, supra note 2, at 113-17.
61. See Melish, supra note 57, at 256; Vandenhole, supra note 57, at 425.
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individuals could voice alleged violations of their rights.62 Others argued
that the ICESCR would be unable to give effect and credence to the rights
it created without an individual complaint mechanism.63
Many of the issues associated with acceptance of an individual
complaint mechanism focus on the collective or community-based nature
of the rights provided for under the ICESCR.64 There is still a good deal of
debate as to whether this will be detrimental to the implementation of a
respected and well-functioning individual complaint mechanism under the
ICESCR or whether the individual complaint mechanism will serve as a
means to clarify that the rights and guarantees under the ICESCR are in
fact primarily and essentially individual in nature.65
During the drafting process that led to the creation of the ICESCR
Protocol text, prominent human rights scholars attempted to draw distinct
categories within each right under the ICESCR, such that there would be an
obligatory element that could be made the subject of an individual
complaint.66 These scholars asserted that the system would establish a
softer set of elements and recommended state practices that would be
beneficial to the implementation of each particular right but which would
not create an obligation that would be sufficient to use as the basis for a
complaint.67 Other arguments centered on the idea of establishing minimum
levels of rights protections based on the importance of certain rights within
the ICESCR.68 The ICESCR Protocol negotiation proceedings generated
several other similar formulas regarding the levels of immediate and future
state obligations for the purposes of justiciability.69 At heart, they all
establish that there is such a dichotomy and that the ICESCR Protocol is
intended to allow for an individual complaint mechanism that at the very

62. See Melish, supra note 57, at 257.
63. Dennis & Stewart, supra note 57, at 462; but see id. at 466 (stating the author’s views that the
rights contained in the ICESCR are not in fact better off in a judicial setting and that empowering the
ICESCR Committee to render judgments on the extent of obligations under the ICESCR is potentially
dangerous as a practice).
64. See Melish, supra note 57, at 259.
65. Melish, supra note 57, at 259.
66. See Arambulo, supra note 2, at 130-31.
67. Arambulo, supra note 2, at 131. It should be noted that, despite the deeply held differences in
state opinion regarding the justiciability of the rights guaranteed under the ICESCR, the international
community and the states that comprise it do, with near unanimity, agree that the rights created under
the ICESCR itself are essential human rights. See Vandenhole, supra note 57, at 430.
68. Vandenhole, supra note 57, at 437-438.
69. Vandenhole, supra note 57, at 443 (discussing several forms of obligation dichotomies,
particularly the idea of the obligations to respect, to protect, and to fulfill); Cees Flinterman, Appendix
II: The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 15 NETH. Q.
HUM. RTS. 244, 247 (1997).
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least holds States Parties accountable under the minimum obligation
standards.70
The preamble to the ICESCR Protocol depends heavily on the terms
and guarantees of the UDHR and the ICCPR, as well as the ICESCR,
emphasizing the individual and the rights guaranteed to him as a result of
his essential human dignity.71 All States Parties agree to and recognize that
“[c]ommunications may be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or
groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be
victims of a violation of any of the economic, social and cultural rights set
forth in the Covenant by that State Party.”72 Those drafting the ICESCR
Protocol specifically chose the term “victim” to ensure that the individual
complaint mechanism would not be read narrowly in terms of standing, and
to guarantee that the mechanism would have a broad construction into the
future.73 In terms of standing, the ICESCR Protocol provides that an agent
is only allowed to submit a complaint on behalf of another person with that
person’s consent or, in the event that consent cannot be established, that the
complainant provide a justification as to why consent is unavailable.74
Jurisdiction over individual complaints brought under the ICESCR
Protocol is vested in the ICESCR Committee.75
Under the ICESCR Protocol, an individual complaint is not admissible
if: all appropriate domestic remedies have not been exhausted (unless “the
application of such remedies is unreasonably prolonged”);76 the complaint
was submitted more than a year after the final exhaustion of appropriate
domestic remedies (unless the complainant was demonstrably unable to
comply with this limitation);77 the facts upon which the complaint is based
occurred before the relevant State Party became legally bound by the terms
of the ICESCR Protocol (unless the acts continued after the State Party
became bound by the ICESCR Protocol);78 the subject of the complaint is
pending before another international body or there was an examination of
the subject of the complaint by another international body;79 the terms of
the complaint are “incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant;”80
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Vandenhole, supra note 57, at 443.
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, at pmbl.
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 2.
Arambulo, supra note 2, at 132.
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 2.
See Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 1; Melish, supra note 57, at 257.
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(1).
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(a).
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(b).
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(c).
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(d).
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there is insufficient evidence presented to substantiate the complaint or the
complaint is “exclusively based on reports disseminated by mass media;”81
“[i]t is an abuse of the right to submit a communication;”82 or, the
complaint is submitted anonymously or not in writing.83 The Protocol
requires that a complaint allege a particular, individual harm, however
there are certain limited circumstances in which this requirement can be
softened to allow for admissibility where the ICESCR Committee decides
that the complaint alleges “a serious issue of general importance.”84
The ICESCR Protocol vests the ICESCR Committee with the ability
to request that the State Party involved in a complaint take steps necessary
to protect the life, integrity, and security of the complainant until there is a
final decision on the complaint.85 Further, the Protocol explicitly requires
that States Parties “take all appropriate measures to ensure that individuals
under its jurisdiction are not subjected to any form of ill-treatment or
intimidation as a consequence of communicating with the Committee.”86
The ICESCR Protocol provides that States Parties are able to renounce
their status as a party to the ICESCR Protocol and to withdraw from the
ICESCR Protocol with the limitation that the renunciation does not become
effective for six months.87 During that six-month time period, the ICESCR
Committee may consider existing complaints against the renouncing State
Party.88
Due to the nature of the rights contained in the ICESCR, the ICESCR
Protocol allows the ICESCR Committee to use a reasonableness standard
when addressing whether a particular State Party is fulfilling its
obligations.89 Additionally, the Protocol vests the ICESCR Committee with
the ability to consult UN and other relevant bodies to receive information
appropriate to its determinations.90

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(e).
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(f).
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 3(2)(g).
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 4.
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 5(1).
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 13.
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 20(1).
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 20(2).
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 8(4).
Optional Protocol to ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 8(3).
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C. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (CERD) was adopted in 1965 and entered into force
in 1969.91 Although the CERD has been widely ratified by the global
community,92 the individual complaint mechanism established under it has
not been as successful in attracting States Parties.93 Indeed, the CERD
individual complaint mechanism only became effective in 1982, when it
received the requisite number of States Parties.94
As with the ICESCR Protocol, states are concerned with the
potentially broad and difficult to define (as well as limit) jurisdiction of an
individual complaint mechanism established to hear alleged violations of
the CERD, which has been drawn in a fluid manner to allow for a high
amount of flexibility in its overall application.95 Interestingly, the opening
paragraph of the CERD preamble contains a broad statement regarding the
essential human rights and dignities of individuals and their place in nondiscrimination laws and protections, which itself can be seen as a vehicle to
support the expansion of the role of the individual in the international
system where violations of the CERD’s provisions occur.96
The individual complaint mechanism is set out in Article 14 of the
CERD.97 Under the terms of this mechanism, both individuals and groups
of individuals have standing to bring complaints against States Parties to
the CERD Committee, provided that the offense occurred within the
jurisdiction of the relevant State Party and pertains to an alleged violation
of the rights contained in the CERD.98 Unlike other international human
rights treaties with individual complaint mechanisms, the CERD requires
that a State Party indicate a domestic body that will be charged with
examining the complaint first.99 In the event that there is no satisfaction
91. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited July 23, 2011) [hereinafter CERD Summary].
92. To date, there are 175 States Parties to the CERD. See CERD Summary, supra note 91.
93. See id. (providing the statements of States Parties that have become part of the individual
complaint mechanism); see also William F. Felice, The UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination: Race, and Economic and Social Human Rights, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 205, 213
(2002).
94. Rüdiger Wolfrum, The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 3 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 489, 511-13 (1999).
95. Felice, supra note 93, at 213.
96. See CERD, supra note 19, at pmbl.
97. CERD, supra note 19, art. 14.
98. CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(1).
99. CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(2).
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from this body, the CERD Committee may then exercise jurisdiction over
the matter.100 Some States Parties elected to bypass this step and declare
that the CERD Committee has jurisdiction without having to go through a
domestic body first—a step which is allowable under the CERD and
arguably promotes individual access to the international system since it
results in an international body having jurisdiction.101
The only justiciability requirement is that a complainant must have
exhausted all applicable domestic remedies prior to bringing the complaint
to the CERD Committee.102 This requirement can be waived when “the
application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.”103
States Parties are allowed to withdraw their assent to the CERD
Committee’s jurisdiction over individual complaints without the usual
waiting period for effectiveness,104 although the CERD ensures that a
withdrawal may not impact any of the complaints pending before the
CERD Committee prior to withdrawal.105
D. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) entered into force in 1981 without any
provisions relating to an individual complaint mechanism.106 In subsequent
years, the idea of creating an individual complaint mechanism for CEDAW
began to gain popularity, resulting in several high-level international
workshops and meetings which sought to frame a potential optional
protocol that would establish an individual complaint mechanism.107

100. CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(5).
101. CERD Summary, supra note91.
102. CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(7)(a).
103. CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(7)(a).
104. CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(3).
105. CERD, supra note 19, art. 14(3).
106. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for
signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]; see
also Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited July 23, 2011) [hereinafter CEDAW Summary].
107. Kwong-Leung Tang, The Leadership Role of International Law in Enforcing Women’s
Rights: The Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention, 8 GENDER & DEV. 65, 67-69 (2000);
Bijnsdorp, supra note 38, at 330; see also Felipe Gomez Isa, The Optional Protocol for the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Strengthening the Protection
Mechanisms of Women’s Human Rights, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 291, 305 (2003) (discussing the
generally accepted idea among the international community that it would be easier to craft an optional
protocol for CEDAW to implement an individual complaint mechanism than to amend CEDAW itself).
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Interestingly, the many official justifications for the proposed optional
protocol tended to focus on benefits that would accrue to society and
women’s rights as a whole, while largely overlooking the effects of
bringing the individual herself into the realm of international human
rights.108 Ultimately, these efforts bore fruit, and in 1999 an optional
protocol providing for an individual complaint mechanism as part of
CEDAW (CEDAW Protocol) was adopted.109 The CEDAW Protocol
subsequently went into effect in 2000110 and currently has 102 States
Parties.111
The preamble to the CEDAW Protocol places heavy emphasis on the
role of CEDAW and other key international human rights documents
(particularly the UN Convention, the UDHR and the combination of the
ICCPR and ICESCR) in crafting the system of international law under
which the individual complaint mechanism for CEDAW could be
created.112
The CEDAW Protocol begins by establishing that States Parties
recognize the CEDAW Committee as having the ability to receive
complaints and also to make decisions regarding these complaints.113
Specifically, the CEDAW Protocol provides that complaints “may be
submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the
jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of
the rights set forth in the Convention by that State Party.”114 The CEDAW
Protocol requires that complainants acting on behalf of another individual
or group establish that they have received the consent of the person or
group on whose behalf they claim to be acting. Nevertheless, a complainant
is permitted to proceed if he is able to provide a sufficient explanation as to
why he is acting without the appropriate consent.115
The justiciability requirements for those seeking to bring complaints
under the CEDAW Protocol are similar to those contained in other
instruments establishing individual complaint mechanisms. All appropriate
domestic remedies regarding the subject matter of the complaint must have
been exhausted prior to bringing a claim under the CEDAW Protocol
108. Tang, supra note 107, at 69.
109. Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19.
110. CEDAW Summary, supra note 106.
111. CEDAW Summary, supra note 106.
112. Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, at pmbl.; see also Tang, supra note 107, at 67
(discussing the gender violence protections attributed to other international human rights instruments
but not to CEDAW).
113. Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 1.
114. Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 2.
115. Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19.
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“unless the application of such remedies is unreasonably prolonged or
unlikely to bring effective relief.”116 In addition, the same issue cannot have
been brought before another international body, nor can it be pending
before another international body at the time the complainant brings the
CEDAW Protocol-based complaint.117 Furthermore, the complaint cannot
be “incompatible with the provisions of the Convention;”118 it cannot be
“manifestly ill-founded or not sufficiently substantiated;”119 it cannot be
“an abuse of the right to submit a communication;”120 and the facts upon
which the complaint is based cannot have occurred before the State Party
was legally bound under the CEDAW Protocol, except in instances where
the complained-of facts continued to occur after the State Party became
legally bound under the CEDAW Protocol.121
The CEDAW Protocol allows the CEDAW Committee to request that
the State Party at issue take interim measures to protect the complainant(s)
from harm until the outcome of the complaint.122 In a further step, the
CEDAW Protocol explicitly requires that “[a] State Party shall take all
appropriate steps to ensure that individuals under its jurisdiction are not
subjected to ill treatment or intimidation as a consequence of
communicating with the Committee pursuant to the present Protocol.”123
Additionally, the CEDAW Protocol requires States Parties to provide their
citizens with information on the Protocol, its terms, and the results of
complaints brought before the CEDAW Committee that involve the State
Party,124 thus empowering individuals through the dissemination of
information.
The CEDAW Protocol requires States Parties to give six months
notice prior to renouncing and withdrawing from the Protocol.125 During
that six-month period, complaints submitted to the CEDAW Committee
prior to the notification date may still be decided.126

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 4(1).
Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 4(2)(a).
Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 4(2)(b).
Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 4(2)(c).
Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 4(2)(d).
Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 4(2)(e).
Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 5.
Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 11.
Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 13.
Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 19(1).
Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 19, art. 19(2).
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E. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) was adopted in 1984 and
entered into effect in 1987.127 Currently, there are 149 States Parties to the
CAT, and sixty-five of these have also agreed to be bound by its individual
complaint mechanism.128 The CAT itself provides for an individual
complaint mechanism under Article 22.129 In line with the general trend, the
preamble to the CAT reinforces the universality of human rights and
dignities, especially those set forth in earlier international human rights law
tenets.130
States Parties to the CAT recognize the ability of the CAT Committee
to consider complaints from individuals, or made on behalf of individuals,
who are subject to the jurisdiction of the state and who allege that they are
victims of a violation of the CAT by the State Party.131 In terms of
justiciability, the CAT Committee cannot hear complaints that are made
anonymously;132 complaints which it finds “to be an abuse of the right of
submission . . . or incompatible with the provisions of [the CAT];”133
complaints where the complainant has not exhausted all relevant domestic
remedies, unless “the application of the remedies is unreasonably
prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person who is the
victim of the violation;”134 or where the subject matter of the complaint has
been or is being heard by another international body.135
States Parties to the CAT are able to withdraw from the individual
complaint mechanism at any time, although withdrawal does not prevent
the CAT Committee from considering complaints that had been lodged at
the time of the withdrawal.136 Found in a separate section of the CAT,
Article 13 requires that States Parties against whom an individual makes a
complaint of torture or related activities provide protection for that
127. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited July 23, 2011) [hereinafter CAT
Summary].
128. CAT Summary, supra note 127.
129. See CAT, supra note 19, art. 22.
130. CAT, supra note 19, at pmbl.
131. CAT, supra note 19, art. 22(1).
132. CAT, supra note 19, art. 22(2).
133. CAT, supra note 19.
134. CAT, supra note 19, art. 22(4)(b).
135. CAT, supra note 19, art. 22(4)(a).
136. CAT, supra note 19, art. 22(8).
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individual “against all ill-treatment or intimidation.”137 These protections
are also extended to witnesses in such claims.138
F. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families
The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW) was adopted in
1990 and entered into force in 2003.139 An individual complaint mechanism
was created under its core terms.140
States Parties to the CMW individual complaint mechanism agree to
allow the CMW Committee to hear complaints from or on behalf of
individuals who are within the State Party’s jurisdiction and assert that they
have been the victim of a CMW right-based violation by the State Party.141
In order to be justiciable, a complaint brought before the CMW cannot be
brought anonymously.142 The complaint cannot, in the view of the CMW
Committee, be “an abuse of the right of submission . . . or [] be
incompatible with the provisions of the [CMW].”143 Further grounds for
non-justiciability include where the same subject matter has been brought
or is before another international body,144 and where all relevant domestic
remedies have not been exhausted (although this requirement can be
waived where the CMW Committee finds that “the application of the
remedies is unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief
to that individual”).145
The CMW provides that a State Party to the individual complaint
mechanism can withdraw from it at any time, although a withdrawal will
not terminate complaints pending against the State Party at the time of the
withdrawal.146

137. CAT, supra note 19, art. 13.
138. CAT, supra note 19, art. 13.
139. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members
of
Their
Families,
UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&lang=en
(last visited July 23, 2011).
140. CMW, supra note 19, art. 77.
141. CMW, supra note 19, art. 77(1).
142. CMW, supra note 19, art. 77(2).
143. CMW, supra note 19, art. 77(2).
144. CMW, supra note 19, art. 77(3)(a).
145. CMW, supra note 19, art. 77(3)(b).
146. CMW, supra note 19, art. 77(8).
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G. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)
was adopted in 2006 and entered into effect in 2008.147 The CRPD itself
does not contemplate an individual complaint mechanism;148 instead, the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD Protocol) was adopted as a separate instrument and also
entered into effect in 2008.149 Of the 106 States Parties to the CRPD,150 64
are currently parties to the individual complaint mechanism.151
There was widespread international questioning as to the need for the
CRPD since essentially it addresses rights that have already been enshrined
as human rights.152 However, proponents successfully argued that these
already existing rights were too broad to provide full protections to those
with disabilities in particular.153 It should be noted that even proponents of
the CRPD assert that the terms of the CRPD are impossible for most States
Parties to implement immediately given that its terms run the gamut of
civil, political, economic, cultural, and social rights.154 Thus, there is
arguably a level of uncertainty regarding whether rights are best decided in
a quasi-judicial setting that is similar to that of the ICESCR Protocol.
Regardless of the stance one takes on this issue, however, it is difficult to
deny that the CRPD and the CRPD Protocol represent a large step in
advancing the individual within the sphere of international human rights
law by allowing the individual to penetrate the international human rights
law system in a meaningful way.155
States Parties to the CRPD Protocol agree to recognize the jurisdiction
of the CRPD Committee to hear complaints brought against them by either
individuals or groups of individuals who are within the State Party’s

147. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV15&chapter=
4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter CRPD Summary].
148. See generally Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted Dec. 13, 2006,
2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008).
149. Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19; see also Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15-a&chapter=4&lang=en
(last visited Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to CRPD Summary].
150. CRPD Summary, supra note 147.
151. Optional Protocol to CRPD Summary, supra note 149.
152. Don MacKay, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 34
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 323, 323 (2007).
153. Id. at 326-28.
154. Id. at 330.
155. See generally id.
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jurisdiction and who allege a violation of the CRPD.156 The requirements
for justiciability of a complaint are that the complaint not be made
anonymously;157 that the complaint is not “an abuse of the right of
submission” and is not “incompatible” with the CRPD;158 that the
complaint has not been examined or is not under present examination by
another international body;159 that all domestic remedies have been
exhausted unless the exhaustion of these remedies is unreasonable or not
likely to bring about meaningful relief to the complainant;160 that the
complaint is not “manifestly ill-founded or not sufficiently
substantiated;”161 and that the events involved in the complaint happened
after the date on which the State Party became bound by the CRPD
Protocol, unless the events complained of continued to occur after the date
on which the State Party became bound by the CRPD Protocol.162
Following the trend in individual complaint mechanism creation, the
CRPD Protocol allows the CRPD Committee to request that a State Party
implement interim measures for the protection of the complainant prior to
the CRPD’s final decision in a complaint.163 States Parties to the CRPD
Protocol are able to denounce the CRPD Protocol and withdraw from it,
although the renunciation will not become effective for a year.164
III. CONVENTION COMPARISIONS
It is evident from Part II that there are many procedural similarities
among the international human rights law treaties that contain individual
complaint mechanisms. Indeed, there are telling similarities for the
individual beyond the fact that the individual has the ability to bring a
complaint before the relevant committee.
Generally, the same standing requirements apply across the
international human rights treaties, namely that the individual must be
under the jurisdiction of a State Party to bring a complaint and that the
violation alleged must be of a right contained in the appropriate treaty.165
This requirement places limits on the individual’s ability to complain and

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note19, art. 1.
Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 2(a).
Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 2(b).
Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 2(c).
Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 2(d).
Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 2(e).
Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 2(f).
Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 4.
Optional Protocol to CRPD, supra note 19, art. 16.
See supra Part II.A-G.
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requires that the State Party itself demarcate who constitutes a person
within its jurisdiction. Indeed, this issue has caused much debate at the
international level in those situations where an individual, by asserting a
violation, has triggered a massive juridical and theoretical undertaking to
determine what it means to be within a state’s jurisdiction.166
There is a split in the international human rights law treaties between
those that only allow individuals to bring complaints,167 those that allow
third parties to complain on behalf of individuals provided that certain
circumstances are met,168 and those that allow individuals, groups of
individuals, or groups acting on behalf of groups or individuals to bring
complaints.169 In part, this procedural break could be a result of differences
in the rights protected by each treaty: some human rights violations are
essentially individual in nature, whereas others, such as racial
discrimination, can be perpetrated against a group as well as against one
individual. Regardless of these procedural differences, individual complaint
mechanisms serve to reinforce the agency of the individual and the extent
to which the individual, whether as a single claimant or as part of a group
of individual claimants, has accessed international legal remedies.
Additionally, those conventions which do require consent for agency
representation reiterate the importance of the individual by seeking to
ensure that complaints are not brought in a manner that could be regarded
as frivolous or otherwise detracting from the seriousness of the allegations
raised.
Much the same can be said for the justiciability requirements that are
standard across most of the international human rights law treaties
discussed above.170 In several instances, international human rights law
treaties contain fewer bars to justiciability,171 which increases the ability of
individuals to assert their rights. Across the instruments, the justiciability
provisions which allow the exhaustion of relevant domestic remedies
requirement to be waived where a strict application of the requirement
would in essence bar the individual from bringing a complaint are
protective measures for the complainant.172 These provisions are crucial to
166. See Ben-Naftali, supra note 37.
167. See supra Part II.A (explaining that the general standing requirement under the ICCPR is
centered on an individual); supra Part II.F.
168. See supra Part II.A (explaining a recent spike in third parties given standing to assert claims
when the injured party has been proven to be unavailable through no fault of his own); supra Part II.B,
II.E.
169. See supra Part II.C-D, II.G.
170. See supra Part II.
171. See supra Part II.C, II.F.
172. See supra Part II.
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enabling the individual to assert his rights at the international level when
that individual’s ability to assert his rights domestically is thwarted by the
State Party itself.
At the same time, the common treaty provisions which bar an
individual from bringing his claim before more than one international
rights body at a time serve a dual purpose.173 As a purely practical matter,
these provisions ensure that multiple cases will not be filed with multiple
bodies, thus resulting in an uneven or confused outcome. The second
consideration is discussed at greater length in Part IV below. By allowing
an individual to bring his claim before only one international body, the
combined international human rights treaties require the individual to select
a single facet of his harm or identity under which to raise his claim, rather
than allowing him to bring a holistic complaint that recognizes the entirety
of his identity and the harms that he has suffered.
Several international human rights law treaties contain provisions
which either require States Parties to protect complainants and witnesses
when they make assertions of wrongdoing at the international level,174 or
allow the appropriate treaty committee to request that the State Party take
interim measures to protect the complainant until the complaint is fully
decided by that treaty committee.175 Perhaps the importance of these
provisions to the individual is obvious. At the same time, these provisions
are essential to the overall availability of the international human rights law
system to individuals because they recognize the unique status of
individuals as potential targets of state or state-sponsored retaliation or
repression, whereas the same is not true in state-to-state complaints in other
legal arenas. By allowing for these protections, the international human
rights law treaties attempt to ensure some level of equality between states
and individuals in terms of potential harms as a result of a treaty-based
complaint.176
The common provisions of the international human rights treaties that
relate to the ability of a State Party to renounce and withdraw from the

173. See supra Part II.
174. See supra Part II.B, II.D, II.G.
175. See supra Part II.A-B, II.D-E.
176. Of course, to think that these provisions would automatically provide protection to those
individuals who come forward with complaints would be naïve, especially in situations where the state
is accused of gross human rights violations such as extra-judicial killings or disappearances. However,
as a matter of drafting, these provisions do give an important window into the place of the individual as
protected within the international human rights law system. These provisions also demonstrate the
importance of the individual’s ability to assert his rights and to penetrate the international human rights
law system.
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individual complaint mechanism,177 and the effect that this has on pending
individual complaints,178 is perhaps less obviously related to the penetration
of the individual into the international human rights law system. Clearly,
the terms of these provisions reflect the continued primacy of states in
international law. They also reflect the importance attached to the
international obligations undertaken by states in the international human
rights realm in that they do not allow State Parties to suddenly withdraw
from the jurisdiction of the relevant committee and also do not allow State
Parties to use withdrawal as a way to stop the investigation of a complaint
that has already been filed. In addition, they reflect the importance of the
relevant treaty committee’s ability to consider individual complaints even
where the State Party seeks to shield itself from such considerations.
The more recent human rights treaties establishing individual
complaint mechanisms tend to allow their respective committees to
examine information from UN agencies and entities deemed relevant, as
well as from other human rights organizations and even regional entities.179
This further contributes to the fragmentation of the individual discussed in
Part IV because it focuses the treaty committee’s attention on a particular
facet of an individual’s identity and leads the committee to disregard other
facets that may be relevant to the human rights violation.
All of the international human rights law treaties that have individual
complaint mechanisms share a common weakness in that the decisions of
their respective committees cannot reliably be enforced at the domestic
level.180 As such, it is widely acknowledged that the punitive and coercive
abilities of these treaty committees are limited to shaming States Parties by
announcing their culpability for human rights violations.181 Some states do
have strong track records of implementing at least a good portion of treaty
committee findings at the domestic level, while others are generally
apathetic to the incorporation of these findings at the state level, often
citing issues of sovereignty.182 Dismissing the punitive weaknesses of the
individual complaint mechanism structure disregards the importance of the
structure to the place of the individual within the international system. The
individual’s ability to penetrate the international system lies not in his
ability to receive compensation—monetary or non-monetary—from the
State Party at the treaty committee’s request, but rather in the ability of the
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See, e.g., supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See Helfer, supra note 52, at 1894.
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individual to bring a state to account for its violations before an
international body and an international audience. In this sense, the ability of
the individual to complain against a state and to receive a finding from a
treaty committee that is critical of the state and that acknowledges to the
world the violations committed by the state is in itself a unique remedy.
On a more theoretical level, it has been argued that the rise of
international human rights law treaties which target certain issues or groups
creates a “pluralization” within international human rights law, whereby
the particular requirements of a group defined by a certain trait or standing
within the community—for example those with disabilities—are given
special protections beyond the existing human rights conventions.183 Under
this model, there is an essential clash between human rights per se, which
are defined as centering on “sameness and unity,”184 and more specific,
group-oriented conventions with human rights law, which can be viewed as
centering on the “difference and pluralism” of the groups being
protected.185 From this supposition, it is then surmised that human rights
themselves may also be used as instruments to examine the concept of
identity as well as dignity within groups rather than within humanity
itself.186 This is important to the comparison of the international human
rights law treaties with individual complaint mechanisms because it applies
as much to them and to the jurisprudence which they produce as to the
overall international human rights treaty system.
IV. ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL PENETRATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The idea of individual human rights, particularly as an outgrowth of
the human rights violations that savaged the world during World War II,
has become an anchor of the international legal system.187 As a field,
international human rights law is centered on asserting the rights of all
mankind and, subsequently, on ensuring that states guarantee and respect
these rights.188 A primary way in which the system holds states accountable
has been to grant individuals stature within the international community to
183. Frédéric Mégret, The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or
Disability Rights?, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 494, 495 (2008).
184. Id. at 496.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Cole, supra note 21, at 1912 (“Postwar world culture endows individuals with tremendous
amounts of moral worth and agency . . . . It also invests them with universal human rights, admonishes
states to respect and protect those rights, and, when necessary, authorizes individuals to defend their
rights against state infringement.”).
188. See Helfer, supra note 52, at 1842.
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charge their governments with human rights violations. Thus, unlike other
regimes of international law, there is an automatic place for the individual
within the international human rights law system.189
At least theoretically, the individual complaint mechanisms used in
international human rights law allow individuals to bring their claims to a
body that is regarded as less biased than domestic courts.190 These bodies
also allow individuals whose voices are frequently not given attention or
value at the domestic level to have greater power and influence in asserting
their rights and claiming personal agency over the acts committed against
them.191 The growth of the individual complaint mechanism within wellaccepted international human rights law treaties has resulted in the
placement of the individual in a different sphere than has been traditionally
accepted as part of the international system;192 and, consequently, has
empowered a new set of international actors to gain a place of primacy.
As an international actor in the human rights system, the individual is
able to express his voice directly without the need to seek representation
from a state or non-governmental organization. Specifically in this context,
the individual has done more than equal traditional international actors; he
has gained a place of primacy. Indeed, by definition, the individual is at the
center of the individual complaint mechanism. Accordingly, a
determination of the violations done to the individual takes precedence
over other considerations which often characterize international legal
adjudications, such as the wishes of the states involved.
Some authors have studied the international human rights law system
and argued that it is becoming “overlegalized,” creating a situation in
which States Parties are under pressure to sign treaties but have difficulty
fulfilling the legal responsibilities therein.193 This is particularly true where
the treaty has been operative for a number of years and has been subject to
interpretation by an oversight body.194 Although this argument has great
merit in some respects, it tends to ignore, or at least undervalue, the place
of the individual in the international human rights law system. It does this
by placing the onus on the applicable oversight body as the instrument of
change and treaty construction over time, and neglecting the impact of

189. Id. (describing the right of individuals under human rights law to enforce international legal
commitments through recourse to international courts and quasi-judicial bodies).
190. See supra Part I.
191. See Bijnsdorp, supra note 38, at 337.
192. See Tang, supra note 107, at 67-68.
193. See generally Helfer, supra note 52; id. at 1854-55.
194. Id. at 1854-55.
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individuals on both the relevant State Party and the international system as
a whole.
Some have asserted that the creation of new international human
rights law treaties, and associated individual complaint mechanisms, works
to reinforce the rights granted to individuals by fostering a series of
interlocking understandings of international human rights law.195 In the
same vein, it has been asserted that these systems work together and indeed
must do so given the nature of the rights that are protected.196 However, this
argument, while attractive, tends to undermine the idea of the universality
of individual human rights and norms that is associated with such seminal
documents as the ICCPR.197 Rather than creating a system in which the
individual, though given a prominent role within the human rights system,
is potentially subject to the jurisdiction of multiple treaties and their
oversight bodies, perhaps the international community ought to amend the
foundational documents of international human rights law, such as the
ICCPR or the ICESCR, so that they cover a wider—or at least more indepth—spectrum of individual rights and protections.
As has been noted, scholars have criticized the pluralization of
international human rights law by treaties which create various
communities or violations.198 This is an important observation and leads
one to question the point at which the inviolable rights germane to all of
mankind as envisioned by original human rights treaties ceases to be
uniform and begins to fragment into sub-classifications of various human
rights-based identities.199
The rise of the individual as more than simply a passive subject and
holder of rights, but rather as an entity that is able to assert—and thereby
make a claim to—these rights demonstrates an evolution in the dynamics of
the actors involved in the international rights law system. However, this
evolution has been carefully tailored by the international human rights law
system, as is evidenced by the justiciability and standing requirements
which are nearly universal to the individual complaint mechanisms
discussed above. A careful tailor can craft something that is as deceptive
from the outside as it is from the inside. Similarly, a careful crafter of any

195. See, e.g., Bijnsdorp, supra note 38, at 332 (describing the positive, stimulating influence
which bodies dealing with the same issue of discrimination against women have on one another).
196. Bijnsdorp, supra note 38, at 330-31.
197. For an argument specifically discussing the overlaps in individual complaint mechanism
bodies, see Dennis & Stewart, supra note 57, at 501-04.
198. See Mégret, supra note 183 (analyzing the pluralization of human rights under the CRPD).
199. Id.
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international instrument can create a document that is at once expansive at
first glance yet restrictive in terms of its actual implementation procedure.
To the outside, individual complaint mechanisms are a state-centered
way to ensure that States Parties are accountable for the obligations that
they undertook as part of the international human rights law system. On the
inside, however, the mechanism is a powerful tool for the individual—
whether directly or through representatives where necessary—to actively
assert and claim his human rights. It cannot be denied that the punitive
aspects of individual complaint mechanisms in the international human
rights law context are weak and most often rely on the power of shame and
international condemnation. This does not, however, defeat the importance
of the ability of the individual to bring these cases in the first place and to
at least generate some form of discussion on these topics. The importance
of this individual role is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that, regardless
of the treaty, states are unwilling to bring human rights law based
complaints against other states.200 Thus, without the individual complaint
mechanism, the horrors of state enforced disappearances and extra-judicial
killings that have occurred under a variety of dictatorships would not be as
well known to the world. It is only through this knowledge that the
international community is forced to see many of the unpleasant truths that
occur within it and to understand the impacts of these human rights
violations on a very personal and intimate level that state-to-state dialogue
does not generate.
At the same time that individual infiltration of the international human
rights law system is beneficial, it creates a danger of fragmentation. Here,
the threat lies in the plethora of international human rights law treaty
committees to which an individual might complain. Much as pluralization
in the group context has a dangerous element to it, fragmentation of
essential human rights and dignities into many international human rights
law treaties with many venues for individuals to complain does not create a
greater unity of understanding or guarantee of human rights. Nor does it
allow the individual to fully assert and claim all of the human rights and
dignities to which he is entitled.
For example, a woman might also be disabled, be part of a national
minority group that is barred from voting, and be tortured by the state in
which she lives. Many of her essential human rights have been violated, but
how is she to know which individual complaint mechanism to use? She
qualifies under several different international human rights treaties and
200. Laboni Amena Hoq, The Women’s Convention and Its Optional Protocol: Empowering
Women to Claim Their Internationally Protected Rights, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 677, 685
(2001).
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identifying her by only one of her traits or allowing her to assert one set of
her rights denies her both individual identity and agency over the human
rights that the international community recognizes are vested in her. By
asking her to choose which aspects of her identity she wishes to express
and which of her human rights she wishes to assert, the international human
rights law system is in fact denying her the active ability to assert herself,
her full identity and her human rights, and is, in effect, reducing the
benefits that it has created through the establishment of individual
complaint mechanisms as accepted tools of international human rights law.
Essentially, this example demonstrates that the more specific
international human rights treaties perpetuate the very harm they claim to
remedy: the broad human rights treaties’ failure to recognize the full
identity of the individual. The flaw here, however, is in a fragmentation of
identity rather than an overly broad or non-specific notion of rights
protection. Ultimately, this diminishes the gains made by individuals in
achieving access to the international human rights system by preventing
them from enforcing the totality of the rights granted them by that system.
CONCLUSION
Human rights are at once a concern of all mankind and intensely
personal rights that touch the core of individuality. They are in need of
protection from violation by states and yet also are intangible entities that
are individual in nature. This sense of duality permeates the key
international human rights law treaties, which provide or will provide a
place for the individual to assert and claim his human rights on the
international stage.
This article established the fundamental background of international
human rights law, discussed the provisions of various individual complaint
mechanisms contained in key international human rights law treaties, and
then compared these mechanisms in order to highlight their importance.
This discussion demonstrated the many points at which individuals are able
to access international human rights law through individual complaints
mechanisms.
Next, this article argued that, while the prominence of the individual is
crucial to assert and claim human rights, the plethora of international
human rights law treaties threatens to fragment individual identity. In the
process, several arguments and theories regarding the place of the
individual in international human rights law were evaluated, with the
benefits and pitfalls of these arguments analyzed.
Rather than allow an ever more specialized international human rights
treaty system to force the fragmentation of individual identity, this article
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suggests that it is better to attend to the full array of individual identities
that could be protected and asserted through already existing international
human rights treaties. In this way, the international human rights law
system could stave off the threat of a fragmented relationship to individuals
by acknowledging all elements of the individual’s identity.

